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THE DISPUTES CLAUSE IN GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS: A SURVEY OF COURT AND
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
JAMES V. JOY*
H subject of this article is a standard clause, or "boilerplate" provi-
Sion, which is included in virtually all supply and construction con-
tracts awarded by the United States Government. The present day
Disputes clause reads substantially as follows:
"Except as otherwise provided in this contract, any dispute concerning a question
of fact arising under this contract which is not disposed of by agreement shall be
decided by the Contracting Officer, who shall reduce his decision to writing and mail
or otherwise furnish a copy thereof to the Contractor. Within 30 days from the date
of receipt of such copy, the Contractor may appeal by mailing or otherwise furnishing
to the Contracting Officer a written appeal addressed to the Secretary, and the deci-
sion of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative for the determination of
such appeals shall, unless determined by a court of competent jurisdiction to have
been fraudulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to
imply bad faith, or not supported by substantial evidence, be final and conclusive;
provided that, if no such appeal is taken, the decision of the Contracting Officer shall
be final and conclusive. In connection with any appeal under this clause, the Contrac-
tor shall be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to offer evidence in support of
its appeal. Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder, the Contractor shall proceed
diligently with the performance of the contract and in accordance with the Contracting
Officer's decision."'
I. ComAIsoN wITH ARBITRATION
The procedure set forth in the Disputes clause resembles arbitration
in many respects. A more basic question might be considered, which often
has been asked-does the Disputes method amount to arbitration?
This question is best answered in the affirmative. The Disputes method
falls squarely into the general class of arbitration.
* First Lieutenant, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Army. Member of
the New York and Connecticut Bars.
The views expr-ssed herein are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent tho.ea
of the Judge Advocate General of the Army or of the Department of the Army.
1. See, Armed Services Procurement Regulations (hereinafter referred to as "ASPR"),
ff 7-103.12, 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12. The clause quoted in the text of this article is subpara-
graph (a) of the Disputes clause contained in the revision of Standard Form 32 which is
presently being circulated for criticism and comments among industry and the Government
departments. Subparagraph (b) of the proposed revised clause reads as follows:
"(b) This 'Disputes' clause does not preclude consideration of law questions in connec-
tion with decisions provided for in paragraph (a) above; Provided, that nothing in this
contract shall be construed as making final the decision of any administrative official, repre-
sentative, or board on a question of law."
2. "The word 'arbitration' is normally applied to all extrajudicial determinations of con-
troversies by judges chosen by the parties to the dispute or their appointees!' 6 Williston,
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This latter statement may appear overly broad in view of the provision
that appeals shall be decided by the Secretary "or his duly authorized
representative." (Emphasis added.) This may seem an undue departure
from customary arbitration practice. Determinations are made not by
third party umpires, but by a representative of only one of the contracting
parties. In private contracts, however, the vast majority of American
courts have permitted the representative of a single party, usually an
architect or engineer, to decide finally certain questions of fact arising
thereunder.3
Accordingly, the requirement that decisions under the Disputes clause
be rendered by a representative of one, and one only, of the parties may
be viewed as being without substantial legal significance4 and little prac-
tical significance.
Until recent times it was generally accepted that in the absence of
permission contained in a specific act of Congress (such as the Contract
Settlement Act of 1944') no officer acting for the United States has the
authority to submit a claim or controversy to the decision of third party
arbitrators.6 Two fairly recent decisions of the United States Supreme
Contracts § 1918 (rev. ed. 1938); Rueda v. Union Pacific, 180 Ore. 133, 175 P,2d 778
(1946); San Antonio v. McKenzie Const. Co., 136 Tex. 315, 150 S.W. 2d 989 (1941);
McMahon v. New York & Erie R.R., 20 N.Y. 463 (1859); Bertram Garden Apts, v.
DeMartini, 108 N.Y.S. 2d 483 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
3. Martinsburg & Potomac Railroad Co. v. March, 114 U.S. 549 (1885) (Engineer);
Sheffield & B. Coal I & R Co. v. Gordon, 151 U.S. 285 (1894) (Superintendent); Chicago
S. F. & C. R. Co. v. Price, 138 U.S. 185 (1891) (Chief Engineer); Southern New England
R. Corp. v. Marsch, 45 F. 2d 766 (1st Cir. 1931) (Chief Engineer or Substitute); Cranford
v. City of New York, 38 F. 2d 52 (2d Cir. 1930) (Engineer); Chatfield Co. v. O'Neill, 89
Conn. 172, 93 Atl. 133 (1915); Hathaway v. Stone, 215 Mass. 212, 102 N.E. 461 (1913);
Frolich v. Klein, '160 Mich. 142, 125 N.W. 14 (1910); Landstra v. Bunn, 81 N.J.L. 680,
80 AtI. 496 (1911) ; Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 242 Pa. 25, 88 Atl. 869 (1913) ; 3 Corbin, Contracts
§ 652 (1951). See also cases cited note 2 supra.
4. "[The Disputes] . . . article provides that, in case of dispute, the decision should be
made by the contracting officer, subject to the contractor's right to appeal to the head of
the department, whose decision should be final. That is a sort of arbitration, albeit by agents
of one party to the contract." George J. Grant Construction Co. v. United States, 124
Ct. CI. 202, 207, 109 F. Supp. 245, 247 (1953).
5. 41 U.S.C.A. § 113(e).
6. United States v. Ames, 24 Fed. Cas. 784 No. 14441 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845); James
McCormick v. United States, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 1, Rep. C.C. No. 199 (Ct. Cl. 1859);
33 Ops. Att'y Gen. 160 (1922); 32 Comp. Gen. 333 (1953); 7 Comp. Gen. 541 (1928). See
31 U.S.C.A. § 673, which provides that no part of any appropriation shall be used to pay the
expenses of any council or board unless its creation has been authorized by an act of Congress,
and further provides that the executive departments shall not detail any employees to such
council or board. See also, Note, Arbitration and Government Contracts, 50 Yale L.J. 458
(1941); Braucher, Arbitration under Government Contracts, 17 Law & Contemp. Prob.
473 (1952).
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Court7 involving the Disputes method (but decided on principles derived
from third party arbitration cases) have prompted the Court of Claims
to hold that third party arbitration may now be generally provided for in
contracts awarded by the executive departments.'
The Comptroller General has ruled to the precise contrary.0 Since the
Comptroller General has the power of disallowing all public vouchers
(prior to, and in the absence of, court judgments) it is believed that his
opinion, and not that of the Court of Claims, will be followed by the exec-
utive departments.
Attempts to distinguish between arbitration and the Disputes method
have unduly hampered endeavors to comprehend and understand the
latter. The rules of law respecting arbitration are uniformly applied to
legal questions arising under the Disputes method. In a leading law
review article on this subject, Judge Leslie L. Anderson observed:
"The similarities between arbitration and the administrative method provided by
the "disputes" article are so substantial that, on principle, the law covering both ought
to be the same generally on this subject except as statutes or the language of agree-
ments may compel a different conclusion."' 0
At the time of Judge Anderson's article, it was thought that questions of
law could not be finally decided under the Disputes method. The Supreme
Court, in United States v. Moorman," brought the Disputes method into
line with a sizeable group of third party arbitration cases which permit
such questions to be finally decided extrajudicially.'
II. HISTORICAL FoUNDATIONs
The roots of the Disputes method reach back to the 1868 case of
United States v. Adams,'3 in which an award of a board, created after the
making of the contract and to whose jurisdiction the contractor submitted
voluntarily, was upheld as being conclusive.
7. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951); United States v. Moorman, 338 Us.
457 (1950).
S. George J. Grant Construction Co. v. United States, 124 Ct. CI. 202, 109 F. Supp.
245 (1953).
9. 32 Comp. Gen. 333, 337 (1953): "In this connection, it is also significant that while
several bills have been introduced in Congress which proposed to grant such general authority
[for third party arbitration], no such legislation has ever been enacted. See ... H.R. 3655,
78th Cong., 1st Sess.; HR. 7163, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 2350, 77th Cong., 2d Se-.. The
Comptroller General, however, has acquiesced in third party '"appraisership.," 20 Comp.
Gen. 95 (1940); 22 Comp. Gen. 140 (1942). The Comptroller General heads the General
Accounting Office. Accordingly, the expr-ssions "Comp. Gen." and "G.A.O. ' are synonymous
for most purposes.
10. Anderson, The Disputes Article in Government Contracts, 44 Alich. L. Rev. 211, 220
(1945).
11. 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
12. See 112 A.L.R. S65 (1937).
13. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 463 (1M68).
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In Kihlberg v. United States,14 a War Department contract for trans-
portation of supplies provided that the ascertainment and "fixing" of
distances traveled by the contractor should be made by the "Chief Quar-
termaster of the District of New Mexico." The Supreme Court held that
the determination of the Chief Quartermaster was, in the absence of fraud
or bad faith, conclusive on both the contractor and the Government.
Other cases followed closely on Kihlberg, reaffirming its principal hold-
ing."0 It took 73 years for the Supreme Court to indicate how closely it
wanted the standard for judicial review, fraud, to be adhered to by the
lower courts.' Kihlberg represented the first major step in the develop-
ment of the Disputes method. Representatives of the Government could
render final and conclusive decisions on, at least, limited questions of fact.
In order of time the next development was judicial approval of provi-
sions for appeals to the Secretary. The Court of Claims in Barlow v.
United States'7 considered a limited disputes provision which, in the case
of a dispute as to the meaning and effect of any passage in the contract,
permitted the Barlow Company to appeal to the Secretary of the Navy
from the decision of the Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks (who
was also the contracting officer) whose decision otherwise would be final.
The Court of Claims recognized the necessity in building contracts that
an architect or engineer pass upon:
"the fitness of the material, the sufficiency of the workmanship, the quality of the
work performed, etc."
Inasmuch as the Secretary of the Navy, in the words of the court, had
"Cno personal knowledge of the matter in dispute," the court invalidated
the provision for appeal. The Supreme Court, on appeal, expressly
reserved decision on the validity of the clause since such a ruling was
unnecessary to its holding.'8 However, a similar clause was again before
the Supreme Court in Plumley v. United States" and was approved,
thereby overruling the Court of Claims dictum in Barlow.
During World War I a clause began to appear in War Department con-
tracts which permitted a contractor, at his option, to petition the Secre-
tary for a decision on:
14. 97 U.S. 398 (1878).
15. Sweeney v. United States, 109 U.S. 618 (1883); United States v. Gleason, 175 U.S.
588 (1900).
16. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98 (1951). But see Ripley v. United States,
223 U.S. 695 (1912) ; United States v. Smith, 256 U.S. 11 (1921).
17. 35 Ct. C1. 514 (1900).
18. 184 U.S. 123 (1902).
19. 226 U.S. -545 (1913). See also Merrill Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 387
(1916) ; Saalfield v. United States, 246 U.S. 610 (1918).
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"any claims, doubts or disputes which may arise under the contract or as to its
performance or non-performance .... "
The decision could be rendered by a "duly authorized representative" as
well as by the Secretary. In those cases where the contractor exercised
his option, the decision whether by the Secretary or his representative,
was final and conclusive. An administrative board, the War Department
Board of Contract Adjustment,"' was established to act for the Secretary
and continued in existence until June, 19212- --when a great measure of
informality again attached to the administrative disposition of disputes
within the War Department.
As early as September, 1921, contract forms of the War Department
were again revised to require the submission of all disputes, under so-
called "Adjustment of Claims and Disputes" clauses, to the "Chief of the
Branch" involved, subject to the contractor's right of appeal to the Secre-
tary.m The contractor no longer had a right of election. The clause
required him either to accept the Chief's decision or to appeal. By this
time the Interdepartmental Board of Contracts and Adjustments had
been created as a part of the Bureau of the Budget. 4 Composed of repre-
sentatives of the Attorney General, the War, Navy, Treasury, Interior,
Agriculture, Labor and Commerce Departments, the Comptroller General
and the Postmaster General, this latter Board was given the task of
standardizing all government contract forms. The Interdepartmental
Board, on June 8, 1923, tentatively adopted a Standard Form of Building
20. War Dep't Supply Circular No. S8, September 7, 1918, quoted on p. XXXVfI of
VoL 1, Dec. WDBC Adjustment.
21. War Dept General Order 103, November 6, 1913; see page M = of Vol. 1,
WDBC Adjustment.This Board became the Appeal Section, War Claims Board, by reason
of War Dep't Gen. Order 40, June 26, 1920, p. IV of Vol. 7, B.C.A. Reports. Although the
Board of Contract Adjustment determined informal and implied contract cases under the
since repealed "Dent Act," Act of March 2, 1919 (40 Stat. 1272), its jurisdiction included
obligations under formal contracts.
22. Smith, The War Department Board of Contract Appeals, 5 Fed. BJ. 74, 77 (1943).
Nineteen years after its dissolution, the Board of Contract Adjustment received the following
high praise from Professor Wigmore. "The Board of Contract Adjustment was vested with
powers to adjudicate upon post-war claims mounting into billions of dollars, and its volumes
of opinions expounding the findings of fact and law are models of clarity and directnes,-
refreshing in their contrast to the futile display of technique upon Evidence rules so often
seen in the opinions of Supreme Courts upon everyday cases of mercantile disputes over
broken contracts." 1 Wigmore, Evidence § 4(c) (3d ed. 1940).
23. War Dep't Gen. Order 10, September 1, 1921. The writer has emphasized the evolu-
tion of the War Department Disputes method because later, when Government contract
forms were standardized, the then prevalent War Department forms served as the starting
points for the standardizations.
24. See Vol. 1, Review of Proceedings, Interdepartmental Board of Contracts and Adjust-
ments, meeting of January 19, 1922.
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Contract which included a provision for "Adjustment of Claims and Dis-
putes" that closely resembles the present day Disputes clause." All Gov-
ernment Departments and Agencies, by January, 1927, were required" to
use Standard Forms 23 (Construction Contract) and 32 (Supply Con-
tract), each of which included Disputes articles.
In this period between Wars, the newer and more general form of
Disputes clause continued to receive the approval of the Supreme Court.2
During the first year of the Second World War, the Supreme Court
decided United States v. Callahan Walker Co.,28 in which it said that the
Disputes clause was a Government Contractor's "only avenue of relief."
In United States v. Blair,29 decided shortly thereafter, the Court reaf-
firmed Callahan Walker and remarked that contractors should appeal deci-
sions ". . . so flagrantly unreasonable or so grossly erroneous as to imply
bad faith. . . ." Otherwise, the Government would lose its opportunity
of mitigating and avoiding damages by administrative correction of errors
or excesses of subordinate officers.
A breakdown in the administrative disputes method then in vogue
occurred at the beginning of World War II. At the outset of the war the
Secretary of War, and the Assistant Secretary did not have time to dis-
charge the quasi-judicial duties required of them by the Disputes article.
In Penker Construction Co. v. United States,80 the Court of Claims ruled
that the failure of the Assistant Secretary to give personal consideration
to an appeal, perfunctorily affirming the decision of lower echelon officers,
was a breach of contract. Under such circumstances a contractor was
entitled to de novo judicial consideration of his claim on the merits. For
a short time numerous Boards came into existence in the various branches
(or technical services) of the Army."' These boards were displaced on
August 8, 1942, by the War Department Board of Contract Appeals 2
which was to determine appeals under all War Department Contracts.
The technical services were given the right to establish intermediate
25. See Vol. 2, Review of Proceedings, Interdepartmental Board of Contracts and Adjust-
ments, meeting of June 8, 1923.
26. Bureau of the Budget Circular No. 197, November 19, 1926. See Vol. 5, Review of
Proceedings, Interdepartmental Board of Contracts and Adjustments, meeting of December
30, 1926. See also Pfotzer v. United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 184, 226, 77 F. Supp 390, 399, cert.
denied, 335 U.S. 885 (1948).
27. United States v. Mason & Hanger Co., 260 U. S. 323 ('1922); United States v. John
McShain, Inc., 308 U.S. 512 (1939). See Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926).
28. 317 U.S. 56 (1942).
29. 321 U.S. 730, 736 (1944). See United States v. Beuttas, 324 U.S. 768 (1945) ; United
States v. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234 (1946).
30. 96 Ct. Cl. 1 (1942).
31. Smith, The War Department Board of Contract Appeals, 5 Fed. B.J. 74, 76 (1943).
32. Id. at 77; Memorandum, Secretary of War, August 9, 1942.
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boards of contract appeals.' The Navy Board of Contract Appeals 34
was created on December 1, 1944. In 1947 the WDBCA changed its
name to the Army Board of Contract Appeals.35 The Army and Navy
Boards were merged in May, 1949 into the Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals which became the designated representative of the Sec-
retaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force to determine appeals under
contracts of each of the respective departments?,
In the years that followed the creation of these boards, many similar
boards were created in other Departments and Agencies of the Federal
Government. Like the ASBCA, some of these boards have the power to
render final decisions for the Secretary or Agency headV7 Others advise
the Secretary or Agency chief, who is free to reject or approve the deci-
sion of his board25
A. Moorman and Wunderlich Decisions
Going back at least as far as Barlow,3 it is possible to observe in Court
of Claims decisions a marked trend, i.e., a disposition to review Disputes
determinations in an ever-widening arc of decisions. In Ripley v. United
Statesl the Supreme Court held that the fraud test of Kihllberg would be
satisfied by a showing that the decision of the contracting officer was "so
grossly erroneous as to imply fraud." The Court of Claims would take
jurisdiction thereafter when the contracting officer's decision was arbi-
trary, capricious, or not supported by substantial evidence: 1 In addition
the lower court ruled that no Secretary had power to determine finally
a question of law, which included the interpretation of drawings and
specifications.
33. 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-12; Smith, The War Department Board of Contract Appeals, S
Fed. B.J. 74, 77 (1943).
34. 1 CCH Gov't Contracts Rep., 1 10,741.
35. 1 CCH Gov't Contracts Rep., ff 10,731.
36. Joint Directive, Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, May 1, 1949; 1 CCH
Gov't Contracts Rep., f 10,721. See Cuneo, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals:
Tyrant or Impartial Tribunal?, 39 A.B.A.J. 373 (1953).
37. Department of Interior Board of Contract Appeals, December 29, 1954; Contract
Disputes Board for Commodity Credit Corporation, April 4, 1946; Corps of Engineers Claims
& Appeals Board, August 9, 1946 (designated representative of the Secretary of the Army
to determine finally appeals involving civil works; has intermediate jurisdiction in appeals
involving military construction); various overseas commands of the Army have Boards with
final jurisdiction up to $50,000, e.g., AFFE/SA BCA, USAREUR BCA.
3S. Atomic Energy Commission Advisory Board of Contract Appeals, April 28, 1948;
General Services Administration Board of Review, Mlarch 7, 1950; Veterans Administration
Construction Contract Appeals Board, April 8, 1949; Veterans Administration Supply Con-
tract Appeals Board, Mlarch 12, 1954.
39. See note 17 supra.
40. 223 U.S. 695 (1912).
41. Needles v. United States, 101 Ct. Cl. 535 (1944).
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In United States v. Moorman, the Court gave effect to a paragraph of
the specifications which made the Secretary of War the final arbiter as to
what was "outside the requirements of the contract."'4  The Court ex-
pressly refused to draw any distinction between the power to decide
finally questions of law and fact. The Court of Claims, on the other hand,
in a long line of decisions had held that under no circumstances could
questions of law be finally decided under the Disputes method.4 4
Two years later, in United States v. Wunderlich, the Supreme Court
defined "fraud" as the standard of review of Disputes determinations:
"Despite the fact that other words such as 'negligence,' 'incompetence,' 'capriciousness,'
and 'arbitrary' have been used in the course of the opinions, this Court has consis-
tently upheld the finality of the department head's decision unless it was founded on
fraud, alleged and proved. So fraud is in essence the exception. By fraud we mean
conscious wrongdoing, an intention to cheat or be dishonest. The decision of the
department head, absent fraudulent conduct, must stand under the plain meaning of
the contract." 45
Ripley v. United States and United States v. Smith4 0 if not overruled,
were to be restricted closely to the facts present in each.
B. Remedial Legislation
Immediately after the Wunderlich decision, demands were made on
Congress for remedial legislation. Congress responded by appending a
rider to the Defense Department Appropriation Acts of 1953 and 1954,
which forbade use of appropriated funds for the purpose of entering into
contracts containing "Article 15" unless the Article was amended to pro-
vide for further appeal by the contractor to the Court of Claims.4 7
42. 338 U.S. 457 (1950).
43. "If the contractor considers any work demanded of him to be outside the require-
ments of the contract or if he considers any action or ruling of the contracting officer or of
the inspectors to be unfair, the contractor shall without undue delay, upon such demand,
action, or ruling, submit his protest thereto in writing to the contracting officer, stating
clearly and in detail the basis of his objections. The contracting officer shall thereupon
promptly investigate the complaint and furnish the contractor his decision, in writing, thereon.
If the contractor is not satisfied with the decision of the contracting officer, he may, within
thirty days, appeal in writing to the Secretary of War, whose decision or that of his duly
authorized representative shall be final and binding upon the parties to the contract... 
338 U.S. 457, 458-59 n. 1.
44. Callahan Construction Co. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 538, 616 (1940). See Pfotzer v.
United States, 111 Ct. Cl. 184, 227, 77 F. Supp. 390, 400, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 885 (1948)
and authorities cited therein.
45. 342 U.S. 98, 100 (1951).
46. See note 16 supra.
47. "Sec. 635. No funds contained in this Act shall be used for the purpose of entering
into contracts containing article 15 of the Standard Government Contract until and unless
said article is revised and amended to provide an appeal by the contractor to the Court of
Claims within ninety days of the date of decision by the Department concerned, authority
for which appeal is hereby granted." 66 Stat. 537; 67 Stat. 356.
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Administratively, application of the rider was limited to construction con-
tracts, and not supply contracts, for the reason that Article 15 is not the
Disputes provision in the latter type of standard form contract.g Con-
gress may have intended that this rider would restore the Court of
Claims' pre-Wunderlick standards of judicial review.49 However, the
wording of the rider appears to be rather explicit. The best deduction
that can be made therefrom is that the Court of Claims was to exercise a
power of review as broad and complete as that of the Departmental
Boards of Contract Appeals.
When Congress came to consider legislation of a more permanent na-
ture, it found that the Comptroller General was as active an opponent of
the Wunderlich and loorman decisions as the contractorsc" His power of
reviewing public vouchers had been limited to the same extent as had been
the jurisdiction of the courts. 1 The contractors also found support in
several law review articles.
As a consequence Public Law 356 was adopted by the 83d Congress.
It reads:
"§ 321. Limitation on pleading contract-provisions relating to finality; standards of
review
"No provision of any contract entered into by the United States, relating to the
finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the head of any department or agency or
his duly authorized representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising
under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to be filed as limiting
judicial review of any such decision to cases where fraud by such official or his said
representative or board is alleged: Provided, however, that any such decision shall be
final and conclusive unless the same is fraudulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary or so
grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith or is not supported by substantial
evidence.
"§ 322. Contract-provisions making decisions final on questions of law
"No Government contract shall contain a provision making final on a question of
law the decision of any administrative official, representative, or board.", 3
48. Comp. Gen. Dec. No. B-112635, Nov. 7, 1952; 1 CCH Gov't Contracts Rep. ff 11,021.
49. Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: The Legis-
lative Battle Over the Wunderlich Case, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 217, 235 (1953).
50. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2191-97 (1954).
51. Sunroc Refrigeration Co. v. United States, 104 F. Supp. 131 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Leeds
& Northrup Co. v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 999 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
52. See note 49 supra; Braucher, Arbitration under Government Contracts, 17 Law &
Contemp. Prob. 473 (1952); Mulligan, The Disputes Clause of the Government Construction
Contracts: Its Mfisconstruction, 27 Notre Dame Law. 167 (1952); Cable, The General
Accounting Office and Finality of Decisions of Government Contracting Officers, 27 N.Y.U.L.
Rev. 730 (1952); Note, 37 Cornell L.Q. 493 (1953); Note, 4 Baylor L. Rev. MC0 (1952).
53. 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 321, 322. In Adinolfi v. Hazlett, 242 Pa. 2S, S3 AtL. 869 (1913) a
statute was declared unconstitutional which itself purported to invalidate any contract con-
taining a provision that the award of an architect or engineer was to be conclucive (or a
condition precedent) to a suit on the contract. The statute was deemed an unreasonable
legislative interference with the right to contract. The Pennsylvania statute, since it involved
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III. SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Disputes method serves two main purposes: first it keeps a gov-
ernment contract moving ("Pending final decision of a dispute hereunder,
the Contractor shall proceed diligently. . . .") and second it provides a
relatively inexpensive and rapid method of settling controversies. Since
passage of Public Law 356 both a contractor"4 and the Government have
been rebuffed by the Court of Claims in their efforts to have the court
preliminarily determine the existence of Public Law 356 criteria for judi-
cial review. The court will permit both parties to litigate again the issues
decided by the departmental board of contract appeals, even to the extent
of introducing evidence, previously available, but not presented to the
executive board.5  The position of the Court of Claims results in consid-
erable added expense to both parties. It stems possibly from a reluctance
on the part of the court to consider twice the same case or perhaps a
genuine desire to accord both parties their "day in court."
A. Question of Law
The provision as to questions of law is prospective. Moorman is still
the law for contracts containing either an "all" Disputes clause or a
"Claims Protests and Appeals" provision, which were entered into prior
to May 11, 1954. As to contracts awarded after that date, a contractor
is under no obligation to appeal a decision on an unmixed question of
law. 6 In declining to appeal a contractor, of course, places himself in
peril of having a court later decide that he had misconceived the question
and that, after all, the question was either one of fact or a mixed question
of fact and law.
Public Law 356 draws a sharp line between questions of law and ques-
tions of fact. The latter standing alone are somewhat rare. It would
seem that, in those cases where the question is a mixed one of fact and
law, the executive department should be given the opportunity to declare
contracts between private persons, is distinguishable from Pubic Law 356. Congress is the
source of the funds for the contracts of the executive branch. It should be permitted to
place reasonable restraints on their expenditure.
54. Oliver Finnie Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 473-53 (1955) (unreported court
order).
55. John A. Johnson Contracting Corp. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 698 (1955).
56. See 41 U.S.C.A. § 322.
57. "A question of 'law' is not a 'claim' of which the court acquires immediate jurisdiction
before the administrative fact finding process is completed. Questions of law usually arise
only after the disputed questions of fact relegated to administrative determination have been
resolved. If a claim arising under a disputes clause involves solely questions of law, then
immediate jurisdiction may properly be held to be present." Atlantic Carriers Inc. v. United
States, 131 F. Supp. 1, 5 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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itself on the law of the case.; 7 Assuming an executive board correctly
determines the law, its application of the law so determined to the facts
of the particular appeal should be left undisturbed but subject to the
other limitations of Public Law 356. The decision of the board of con-
tract appeals on a mixed question should not be upset unless (a) the law
portion is severable and (b) the expression of law is erroneous.ra
In those cases where a contracting officer refuses to consider a claim
on the ground that the contractor has presented a question of law only,
or a claim for damages for breach of contract, the contractor has an
option. He may administratively appeal" or he may sue in court. This
election exists even if the contracting officer erred in mistaking a ques-
tion of fact for a question of law."0
The ASBCA has taken jurisdiction in cases normally looked on as
involving questions solely of law, controversies as to interpretations of
writings, controversies as to the effect to be given admitted or wholly
stipulated facts.6 As to Army and Air Force appeals, this is done not
only by virtue of the Disputes clause, but also under an early memo-
randum of the Secretary of War which allowed the WDBCA to:
"b. Consider and administratively pass on appeals not specifically or impliedly
authorized by the contract where the ruling appealed from is not thereby made final
and conclusive, and the appeal is taken within the time fixed in the contract for
appeals.
"c. Find and administratively determine the facts out of which a claim by a con-
tractor arises for damages against the Government for breach of contract, without
expressing opinion on the question of the Government's liability for damages.",a
In view of the existence of a remedy for deciding certain questions of law
(i.e., in cases involving unmixed questions of law) one might ask whether
58. "The finding of an administrative department upon such a question of fact com-
mitted to it for determination is conclusive on the courts if it is supported by substantil
evidence; and that rule applies in cases where there is a mixed question of law and fact,
unless the court is able to separate the question in such manner as to see clearly in what
manner a mistake of law occurred. A court may review the question only where there was
no substantial evidence to sustain the finding, or where the administrative officers committed
a material error of law ... ." United States v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 101 F2d 156, 159-60 (10th Cir. 1939).
59. See, e.g., The O'Brien Dieselelectrics Corp., ASBCA No. 2697 (1956).
60. Thomas Earle & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 100 Ct. CL 494 (1944).
61. Waterman Steamship Corp., ASBCA No. 362 (1951); General Dry Batteries, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 641 (1951). See also cases cited in notes 116, 117 infra. and Blake Construction
Co., ASBCA No. 2918 (1956).
62. Memorandum, 4 July 1944. See Forest Box & Lumber Co., ASBCA No. 2916 (1956).
The Secretary of the Navy has not made any comparable delegation of extra-Disputes clause
authority. Accordingly, the Navy panel of the ASBCA will usually, in its dscretion, decline
taking jurisdiction in cases where the only question is one of law. Minneapolis-Moline Co.,
ASBCA No. 1961 (1954).
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a contractor is placed under any duty to exhaust this administrative
remedy before he may proceed in court. The cases have uniformly held
that this avenue need not be exhausted for much the same reason that
the remedy available in the General Accounting Office need not be ex-
hausted.' The courts will look to the contract (as limited by Public Law
356) to learn if a contractual remedy is provided and also will look to the
Tucker Act0 4 to ascertain its own jurisdiction. No provision in Govern-
ment Contracts, as now written, prevents de novo judicial consideration
of questions of law arising thereunder. It is, therefore, more accurate to
say that a contractor must exhaust his contractual remedies, omitting
mention of his broader administrative remedies.
B. Fraud
Although United States v. Blair65 indicates that a decision involving a
mistake so grossly erroneous "as necessarily to imply bad faith" should
be appealed, the obligations of a contractor victimized by a fraudulent
decision present an open question. This problem should be resolved by
looking to whether the contractor, during the entire 30 day period follow-
ing the fraudulent decision, had knowledge of the fraud. Where such
knowledge was had the contractor should look to the Secretary for relief.
In the absence of such knowledge, it is safe to say there would be uni-
versal agreement that the contractor has no duty of pursuing his con-
tractual remedy. Under the latter circumstances he would be free to sue
in court.
The Wunderlich decision spelled out the rather exacting elements of
proof necessary before a contractor will avoid a disputes determination
on the ground of fraud. In a case where a decision is not appealed from
and where the other criteria of Public Law 356 seem satisfied, this
difficult avenue, nevertheless, may be the sole means of relief open to a
contractor.
Despite some of the language in Wunderlich, it is possible for a con-
tracting officer to render a fraudulent decision without himself being
guilty of fraud. When his decision is based on material evidence fraudu-
lently presented by one of the parties, the fraudulent intent of the witness
will vitiate the otherwise final decision. 66
63. See Anderson, supra note 10, at 216.
64. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1491; 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346.
65. 321 U.S. 730 (1944).
66. In Forrest City Box Co. v. Sims, 208 Fed. 109 (8th Cir. 1913), defendant's inspector
marked certain logs as rejected. Later, before the logs were delivered to defendant, plaintiff
removed the markings. The Circuit Court ruled that the fraud of the plaintiff vitiated the
decision of the inspector, whose decision by the terms of the contract was otherwise to be
final and conclusive. The trial court's judgment for plaintiff for the price of the logs accord-
ingly was reversed. Frolich v. Klein, 160 Mich. 142, 125 N.W. 14 (1910), involved an archi-
tect's certificate which was shown to be a fraud on the building owner.
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C. Quasi Fraud
Decisions that are "capricious," "arbitrary," "so grossly erroneous as
to imply bad faith," or "not supported by substantial evidence" must be
appealed to the head of the department.0 7 An exception exists where the
machinery for such appeals is inadequate. A close reading of Public Law
356 will reveal that the decision of the department head must not be
"capricious," "arbitrary," etc. As for the contracting officer, apparently
he needs only to avoid finally deciding questions of law.
In Needles v. United States, the Court of Claims suggested possible
grounds for holding a decision arbitrary:
"A decision or finding may be held to be arbitrary when existing important facts,
conditions, and express contract provisions should obviously have been considered and
given due and proper weight, but were not. A decision may be found to be arbitrary
when the facts show that the person given authority to decide took the position that
the matter involved was a matter to be disposed of in his discretion when such obvi-
ously was not the case and he was required by the contract to consider and weigh
facts, circumstances, and conditions, as well as to interpret and be governed by certain
standards contained in the terms of the contract. Such actions, under proof sufficient
to show that if the contracting officer had properly and reasonably considered the
facts and contract provisions he should and probably would have reached a different
conclusion, would not be consistent with good faith ... [and with] the position of
the officer as a fair and impartial arbiter."0 8
Many of the subdivisions contained in Public Law 356 are somewhat
redundant. It is hard to imagine a "capricious" decision, or a decision
"so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith" which will not be at the same
time "arbitrary."
The substantial evidence test was borrowed from the Administrative
Procedure Act (whose criteria for judicial review of administrative deter-
minations, have no application to boards of contract appealsO) which
provides that rulings of administrative agencies shall be supported by
"substantial evidence" 70 :
"Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'
The Federal rule, contrary to that of many states,7 allows a record made
up wholly of hearsay to stand as supported by substantial evidence, pro-
vided the reviewing court finds the hearsay evidence to be reliable.73 The
67. 321 U.S. at 736.
68. 101 CL Cl. 535, 603 (1944).
69. R.F. Clifton, WDBCA No. 1201 (1947).
70. 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009.
71. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1933).
72. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916), requirw that a
"residuum" of legally competent evidence support the administrative determination.
73. Art Metals Const. Co. v. NLRB, 110 F. 2d 143, 149-50 (2d Cir. 1940) ; International
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substantial evidence must remain so when considered in the light of the
entire record.74
The substantial evidence test was made a part of Public Law 356 in an
indirect effort to make available to contractors interdepartmental memo-
randa unavailable to contractors but which supposedly were being used in
reaching disputes determinations. 5 The application of this test in the
Disputes area has produced a problem which has been encountered in no
other area of the law. No provision is made in Public Law 356 for deci-
sions in cases where there has been a failure of proof."0
The ASBCA and other similar boards of contract appeals do not always
impose the burden of proof upon a contractor as sometimes appears from
the decisions.7 7 In cases where the Government is making a claim or
chargeback the boards require that the Government carry the burden."
Language in a good number of cases may indicate that there is a presump-
tion of correctness or regularity inhering in the contracting officer's deci-
sion."0 These cases-as well as cases speaking of the contractor's burden
of appeal, as if there always was such a burden-should be examined
closely in the light of the claims being made in each.
Should "substantial evidence" be divorced from burden of proof, an
absurd situation will result. Assume a case where the contractor has the
burden of proof. A good example would be where he alleges receipt of
defective government furnished property. The contractor after appealing
remains silent and refuses administratively to present a case. In order
for the Government to succeed, must it present substantial evidence dis-
proving the claim of the contractor? Assume it must, and that a board
decides against the Government for failure to introduce such evidence.
The decision against the Government in such a case will not be supported
by substantial evidence as required by Public Law 356. The only other
solution would be to require the board to itself secure substantial evidence
so that its decision could be adequately supported.
Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 110 F. 2d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1939), aff'd, 311 U.S. 72 (1940);
NLRB v. Remington Rand, Inc., 94 F. 2d 862 (2d Cir. 1938). See Cooper, Administrative
Agencies and the Courts, Mich. Legal Studies, 194-98 (1951).
74. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
75. 2 U.S. Code Con. & Ad. News 2194-95 (1954).
76. For burden of proof: under the Administrative Procedure Act, see 5 U.S.C.A.
§ 1006(c); in the Tax Court, see 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 6902(a), 7454, 6902(a), T. C. Rule
32; before the Interstate Commerce Commission, 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(7).
77. A.E. Ratner Chemical Co., ASBCA No. 474 (1950).
78. Capitol Laundry, ASBCA No. 2576 (1955) (laundry shortage); Skanacid, ASBCA
No. 798 (1951) (cause of swollen cans of herring) ; Federazione Italiana dei Consorgi Agrarl,
ASBCA No. 848 (1952) (excess costs accruing after termination for default); Pittston
Stevedoring Corp., ASBCA No. 948 (1952) (contractor negligence in unloading a ship).
79. Imparato Stevedoring Corp., ASBCA No. 2266 (1954); McKinnon, IBCA No. 4
(1955).
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There are several ways of resolving this problem. One method would
be merely to say that the failure of proof is itself a sufficient substitute
for substantial evidence. Another way would be to look on the contrac-
tor's failure of proof as a failure on his part to exhaust his contractual
remedy. Originally, substantial evidence found its way into the Disputes
area as a step-child of the arbitrary test.80 A Secretary's decision was
arbitrary in that it was not supported by substantial evidence. A third
way would be to say that the substantial evidence test is applicable only
when the decision is also arbitrary.
IV. DE Novo JUDICIAL CONSIDERATION
On questions of law, as stated previously, the contractor has the option
of appealing administratively1 or of immediately suing in court 2 In
either instance there can be no finality inhering in any administrative
determination. In a case where the contracting officer denies having
authority to pass on the merits of a question, the same election exists,
even in cases where the contracting officer erroneously viewed the limita-
tions placed on him. 3
Upon the request of the contractor for findings of fact and a decision,
the contracting officer has a reasonable time in which to communicate his
written decision to the contractor. After passage of a reasonable time in
which the contractor has not heard from the contracting officer, he has
a three-way election of:
(a) continuing to await the decision of the contracting officer, in the
hope that it will be favorable, or
(b) treating the failure to find as being itself a decision denying the
claim and appeal to the Secretary, 4 or
(c) treating the failure to find as a breach of contract and waiver by
the Government of the Disputes clause, and initiating suit immediately 5
If the contracting officer should expressly refuse to make a decision, the
80. Wagner Whirler & Derrick Corp. v. United States, 123 Ct. CL 3S2, 386, 121 F. Supp.
664, 666-67 (1954), and cases cited therein.
81. See note 59 supra.
82. See note 60 supra.
83. Ibid.
84. See the O'Brien dieselelectric Corp., ASBCA No. 2697 (1956) ; for an analogous propo-
sition. No cases have been found which expressly pass on the authority of boards or depart-
ment heads under these circumstances.
SS. Universal Power Corporation v. United States, 112 Ct. CL 97 (1943). "As we have
many times held, the contract placed upon the contracting officer and the Secretary of War
the duty of making decisions, and their failure to do so is a breach of contract, which
authorizes plaintiff to bring suit in this court to recover the amount to which it is entitled
under the contract." Cape Ann Granite Co. v. United States, 10O CL Cl. 53, 71 (1943), cert.
denied, 321 US. 790 (1944).
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contractor may follow (b) or (c) without waiting for the expiration of
even a reasonable time.86
Once the contractor has filed his appeal, the contracting agency has at
most a reasonable time in which to forward the appeal file for action by
the Secretary, who in turn has a reasonable time to determine the appeal.
The various steps should be looked on merely as being parts of a whole.
The question should be whether the overall administrative process will be
completed in a reasonable time.
As a rule of thumb the Court of Claims 1 and certain of the District
Courts 8 have said that two years is a reasonable time in which to com-
plete all the steps of the disputes procedure, the two years commencing on
the day of filing of the notice of appeal and ending on the day of decision
by the Secretary or his representative. The courts will treat a delay
beyond that time as a breach of contract and accord a contractor a
hearing on the merits of his case.
In August, 1955, the ASBCA revised its Rules to provide, among other
things, that a contracting officer should forward all notices of appeal
received by him within ten days thereafter.8 ' At least one suit has been
filed in the Court of Claims wherein the contractor alleged that a delay
of 95 days90 in forwarding his appeal was a waiver of the Disputes
clause. It will be of some interest to see what disposition the court makes
of this case. The proposition that rules and regulations confer a contrac-
tual right, even though not incorporated into the contract by reference,
is somewhat novel.
It is possible to obtain de novo judicial consideration of the merits of
a dispute by showing that the purported decision of the contracting officer
is a nullity and is without effect.91 In the past this has been accomplished
in a number of ways:
(a) proof that the contracting officer did not himself sign the deci-
sion. 2
(b) it appearing on the face of the decision that the contracting officer
86. Cape Ann Granite Co. v. United States, 100 Ct. Cl. 53 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
790 (1944).
87. Southeastern Oil Florida v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 480, 115 F. Supp. 198 (1953).
88. Wessel Duval & Co. v. United States, 126 F Supp. 79 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
89. ASPR, app. A, pt. 2, Rule 4; 32 C.F.R. § 1301; 1 CCH Gov't Contracts Rep.
ff 10,721.
90. James Kennedy, Trustee for Greenstreet Inc. v. United States, Ct. Cl. No. 425-55 (filed
1955).
91. John A. Johnson Contracting Corp. v. United States, - Ct. CI. -, 132 F. Supp.
698 (1955).
92. King v. United States, 37 Ct. Cl. 428 (1902); Zweig Co. v. United States, 92 Ct. Cl,
472 (1941).
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has attempted to delegate his authority to make decisions under the Dis-
putes clause, an authority which can not be delegatedVI
(c) proof that the decision of the contracting officer was not based on
his independent judgment, but in fact represents the decision of his
superiors.94
(d) where the contracting officer has not acted "... impartially in
settling disputes. He must not act as a representative of one of the con-
tracting parties, but as an impartial, unbiased judge.""
(e) the decision reveals an"... utter lack of basic findings (of fact]
required to support it.""30
(f) when the decision reflects a "... complete unawareness of the
problem on the part of the deciding officer. 137
It would seem that the last three grounds represent arbitrary actions on
the part of the contracting officer, which following Blair (and Public Law
356) should be appealed to the Secretary.
The ASBCA has permitted contractors to rely on decisions of officers
superior to the contracting officer as being appealable decisions.03 These
superiors have themselves been contracting officers and the board has
impliedly called attention to the contractual definition of "contracting
officer," which allows for more than one "contracting officer."2 9 On the
other hand, the Government has not been permitted to rely on the deci-
sion of a superior to the contracting officer °10 and allege failure to exhaust
the contractual remedy.
Quite often decisions are made by "successor" contracting officers, who
are contemplated in the contract. The courts, it seems certain, will not
permit the Government to replace a contracting officer for the sole put-
93. Phoenix Bridge Co. v. United States, 5 Ct. CI. 603 (1937); Hirch v. United States,
94 Ct. CL 602 (1941).
94. Standard Dredging Co. v. United States, 71 Ct. CL 218 (1930).
95. Penner Installation Corp. v. United States, 116 Ct. Cl 550, 563, S9 F. Supp. 545, 547,
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 340 U.S. 898 (1950); cf. Silas lason Co. v. United
States, 90 Ct. Cl. 266 (1940).
96. Climatic Rainwear Co. v. United States, 115 CL Cl. 520, 560, 83 F. Supp. 415, 421
(1950).
97. f1. at 566, 88 F. Supp. at 425, citing Henry Ericsson Company v. United States, 104
Ct. CL 397, 62 F. Supp. 312 (1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 784 (1945).
98. Waterman Steamship Corp., ASBCA No. 371 (1951). See Keith S. Merritt, ASBCA
No. 85 (1949).
99. General Provision 1, Standard Form 32 (Supply Contract) reads, in part, "(b) The
term 'Contracting Officer' means the person executing this contract on behalf of the Govern-
ment, and any other officer or civilian employee who is a properly designated Contracting
Officer ... ." See also General Provision 1(b), Standard Form 23A (Construction Contract).
100. John A. Johnson Contracting Corp. v. United States, - Ct. Cl. - 132 F. Supp. 693
(1955).
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pose of having the new contracting officer render a decision which the old
contracting officer has refused to make.1"'
A final situation in which a contractor will obtain judicial consideration
of his claim on the merits occurs when the Government ard the contractor
waive the Disputes clause. Such waiver can be implied from the conduct
of a United States Attorney. 102
V. JUDICIAL RELIEF FOR THE GOVERNMENT
Only the contractor may appeal to the Secretary from a decision of a
contracting officer made pursuant to the Disputes clause. When a con-
tractor sues the Government, a counterclaim may be pleaded alleging
either a fraudulent disputes determination or one containing material
errors of law.10 3 During the committee hearings on Public Law 356, the
Comptroller General submitted a bill, which the Judiciary Committees of
both the House and Senate stated in their report became in substance,
Public Law 356.104 There can be no question that the Comptroller Gen-
eral wanted the right to review Disputes determinations of contracting
officers that were either arbitrary or capricious. It will take a good deal
of judicial construction to reach this latter result. Public Law 356 says
that it is the decision of the head of the department that should not be
arbitrary or capricious, and does not speak of the contracting officer.
Parenthetically, it should be added that there are still certain decisions of
contracting officers that may not be appealed-the so-called satisfaction
cases'0 5 (i.e., each is final unless determined by the department head to
be arbitrary).
The ordinary method by which the Government obtains judicial review
is somewhat roundabout. The Comptroller General will refuse payment
on a voucher which is to pay the amount owing by reason of a Disputes
decision. Thereafter the contractor usually will sue for payment under
the Tucker Act, relying on either the decision of the contracting officer or
the Secretary.0 The Government then defends the suit by pleading the
101. Ibid.
102. United States v. Lennox Metal Manufacturing Co., 131 F. Supp. 717 (E.DN.Y.
1954), aff'd, 225 F. 2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955).
103. See Bell Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 120 Ct. Cl. 398, 100 F. Supp. 661 (1951),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 344 U.S. 860 (1952).
104. 2 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2191 (1954).
105. Ideal Vans, ASBCA No. 2724 (1955); Harry A. Dundore, ASBCA No. 579, 5 CCF
61134 (1950). See Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536 (1926). In such cases a board of contract
appeals will not substitute its decision for that of the Government officer. It will merely
review his decision to determine whether it was arbitrary or capricious.
106. See note 103 supra. See also Cable, The General Accounting Office and Finality of
Decisions of Government Contracting Officers, 27 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 780-91 (1952). In the last
cited article the statement at 781 that disputes as to allowable costs made up the bulk of the
work of the NBCA and the WDBCA, is not completely accurate.
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limitations of Public Law 356. In Northrop Aircraft Inc. v. United
States,0 7 the Court of Claims sustained the Comptroller General's with-
holding of an amount previously determined to be due a contractor by
the ASBCA. The question involved was solely one of law, the construc-
tion of Treasury Decision 5000 as to the reimbursability of recovered
taxes under a Cost-Plus-A-Fixed-Fee contract. It represents the first time
that any court since Wunderlicit has reversed a disputes determination
which was favorable to the contractor.
VI. COMPLANCE WITH THE DIsPuTEs CLAusE
The thirty day appeal period closely resembles a statute of limitations.
Illness of an appellant affords no excuse for failure to appeal within the
prescribed period.' The fear of a contractor, that by appealing, he will
incur the enmity of the contracting officer likewise does not excuse a
failure to appeal.' This is true even if the contract has many months
more to run and the contractor views as essential his good relations with
the contracting officer.
In a 1955 case, Design Center Inc.,10 the ASBCA held as premature,
on somewhat confusing and unclear grounds, a contracting officer's deci-
sion which was not appealed from for seven weeks. Within six days after
receiving the decision, the contractor requested that the contracting officer
furnish a second copy of the decision since the first decision had been
misplaced soon after being received. The contractor received the second
copy three weeks after its time for appeal had expired. In ruling that the
appeal was premature, the board said:
"There undoubtedly can be situations where the Government has caused an appellant
to delay the fling of an appeal and thus be precluded from asserting that the appeal
is not timely. In our opinion this is not such a case.""'
This decision, it is believed, indicates that the ASBCA will break with
the thirty day rule when sufficiently strong facts are presented. The
writer has not been able to find any decisions as to the effect of the thirty
day rule in the face of genuine physical impossibility, such as internment
in time of war, insanity, physical unconsciousness.
A contractor will not be required to appeal before:
(a) a disputed question of fact exists between the parties, and
(b) he receives a "final" decision of the contracting officer.
107. 130 Ct. CL 626, 127 F. Supp. 597 (1955).
105. Fraser Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 3001 (1955) ; MacLean Industries, Inc., ASBCA
No. 1964 (1955).
109. Perry McGlone v. United States, 96 Ct. CL 507, 540 (1942); American Bridge Co.
v. United States, 25 F. Supp. 714 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
110. ASBCA No. 2325 (1955).
111. Id. at 3.
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In Esmond Chemical Co., Inc., the ASBCA said:
"The decision from which the appeal is required to be taken must be of a dispute
involving questions of fact. The word 'dispute' means . . . 'verbal controversy; con-
test by opposing argument or expression of opposing views or claims .... -112
A. Premature Appeals
The rule that a contractor may not appeal prior to the rendering of a
decision by the contracting officer is generally recognized and frequently
applied by boards of contract appeals. s The application of this rule to
particular factual situations, however, is often a difficult matter. Quite
obviously the contracting officer can not accompany his decision with a
finding of fact relative to each element of evidence relied on by the con-
tractor. Issues of fact are presented to the contracting officer for his
determination along with evidence supporting the position of both parties.
The issues must be narrowed somewhat beyond the mere categorical
assertion of a claim. Later, before the board of contract appeals, the
parties will pursue the issues presented to the contracting officer with
more elaborate and thorough evidence. Such boards do not restrict an
appellant to the evidence presented to the contracting officer, but only
restrict him to the issues so presented.
In giving reconsideration to its original opinion in Maudlin & Son Mfg.
Co., Inc., the ASBCA observed:
"At the outset, it should be noted that this Board's jurisdiction is appellate. We do
not have jurisdiction over a disputed question unless it is a question which, because
it could not be decided by agreement between the contractor and contracting officer,
has been decided by the contracting officer."14
"The Board finds nothing in its opinion that can be construed to mean that 'a
specific determination by the contracting officer is required as to every possible con-
tention which may be inferred from a contractor's appeal.' On the contrary, what
the Board has said is that an issue, and not an inference that an undisclosed issue
exists, must be presented to and decided by the contracting officer before it can be
presented to this Board. 1114a
B. Absence of a Disputes Clause: Appeals by Subcontractors
The Federal Government does award a limited group of contracts,
usually for small amounts of money, which do not contain Disputes pro-
112. ASBCA No. 938 (1952).
113. S. Patti Constr. Co., ASBCA No. 1934 (1954); Wind Turbine Co., ASBCA No.
2528 (1955); Cornelia Garment Co., ASBCA No. 1673 (1954); Society Brand Hat Co.,
ASBCA No. 235 (1951); Al.. Kornman Co., ASBCA No. 282 (1950). After being rendered,
a decision must be communicated to the contractor before he may appeal.
114. ASBCA No. 2027, at 3 (1955) (motion for reconsideration).
114a. Id at 6.
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visions.11 Also, in awarding a major contract, the Disputes provision
may be omitted through inadvertence. In either instance a contractor
who is unable to settle his dispute with the contracting officer has his
judicial remedy and may not seek relief before a board of contract
appeals. 1 5a
The ASBCA has taken limited jurisdiction in certain cases to deter-
mine whether a contract had come into existence between an appellant
and the Government. This may come about because of an allegation of
vague and uncertain specifications,1 or upon an allegation that the pur-
ported award of the Government was only a qualified acceptance of, or
counter offer to, the bid made by the appellant. 7 In the latter instance,
unless the contractor subsequently accepts the qualification either ex-
pressly or through its conduct in commencing performance, there can be
no contract between the parties and, hence, no Disputes clause.
In one notice of appeal, the contractor stated:
"This appeal is not taken pursuant to any specific provision of the contract in ques-
tion, it being the Contractor's conception that Article 12 [Disputes] of the General
Provisions is not applicable here. Rather, this appeal is taken pursuant to the general
equities inherent in the case .... ,,118
The ASBCA, in dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction, stated:
"This Board has no general equitable powers. It depends upon the specific terms of
the contract for its power to act and its charter for authority to represent the Secre-
tary of the Army.""u 9
A subcontractor is not in privity of contract with the Government and
has no right to appeal in its own name under the Disputes clause of the
prime contract.10 However, it is possible for a prime contractor to appeal
in behalf of its subcontractor. This latter principle is subject to one
significant exception. A prime contractor may not appeal (nor maintain
a legal action) for additional compensation if the subcontract (or any
general or special release) contains a clause waiving claims against the
prime contractor for expenses or losses to the subcontractor accruing
because of some act on the part of the Government.' The Government,
115. Yurchase Orders of the military departments for -5,00.0 or les3 may contain
disputes provisions but need not. See ASPR 7-102 and, e-g., APP 7-102.
11a. Eugene Dietzgen Company, WDBCA No. 445 (1944).
116. Joseph Vimal, ASBCA No. 866 (1952).
117. Kilgore Sales Co., ASBCA No. 2778 (1955). See California Bag Co., ASBCA No.
2679 (1955).
118. South River Coat Co., ASBCA 2492, at 2 (1954).
119. Ibid.
120. St. Louis Lighting Protection Co., ASBCA No. 163 (1949). See Hawthorn Manu-
facturing Co., ASBCA No. 722 (1952) which included an attempted appeal by a surety
company. See also Forrest Box & Lumber Co., ASBCA No. 2916 (1996).
121. Severin v. United States, 99 Ct. Cl. 435 (1943), cert denied, 322 US. 733 (1944); James
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as well as the prime contractor, may avail itself of these exculpatory
provisions, whether the claim be made under the Disputes clause or as the
basis for a suit in the Court of Claims. In the absence of such exculpa-
tory provisions, the prime contractor may consent to having the subcon-
tractor prosecute the appeal, the appeal being taken, at all times, in the
name of the prime contractor.ala This permission may be provided for at
the time of drafting the subcontract, 2 so that the prime contractor is
relieved of all active participation in the future appeal.
C. "Final" Decisions
The decision of the contracting officer, as well as the notice of appeal
of the contractor, may be premature. The issuance of a decision, before
a dispute has actually arisen, will not compel the contractor to appeal. 123
However, it must be borne in mind that the fact of existence of a dispute
may be shown by oral evidence and may even be implied from conduct.
Although the decision of the contracting officer need not follow any
precise formula of words, it must fairly and reasonably inform the con-
tractor that a determination under the Disputes clause is intended.124
Regulations of each of the three armed services require that the decision
of the contracting officer make specific reference to the Disputes clause
and, in addition, remind the contractor of his right of appeal.20 Where a
contracting officer fails to follow such regulations, a serious question
arises as to whether he intended to render a final decision.
A sharp distinction must be drawn between written communications
from the contracting officer, which may be relied upon by the contractor
for purposes of taking an appeal, and communications which the Govern-
Stewart & Co. v. United States, 105 Ct. Cl. 284, 63 F. Supp. 653 (1946); Continental Ill.
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 126 Ct. Cl. 631, 115 F. Supp. 892 (1953); Charles H. Tompkins
Co., ASBCA No. 2661 (1955).
121a. General Installation Co., ASBCA No. 2061 (1954). See Warren Brothers Roads
Co. v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 48,83-84, 10SF. Supp. 826,831 (1952).
122. See General Motors Corp., VDBCA No. 174 (1943); Chrysler Corp., WDBCA
No. 39 (1943). The latter case is susceptible of various interpretations. Certain language In
the opinion indicates that the subcontractor, which was permitted to appeal in its own name,
was treated by the WDBCA as being in privity of contract with the Government since its
"major" subcontract was approved by the Government at the time of execution of the prime
contract with the Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Company.
123. Esmond Chemical Co., ASBCA No. 938 (1952).
124. Climatic Rainwear Co. v. United States, 115 Ct. Cl. 520, 88 F. Supp. 415 (1950);
Allied Contractors v. United States, 129 Ct. CI. 400, 407, 124 F. Supp. 366, 370 (1954) ; cf.
Poloron Products Inc. v. United States, 126 Ct. Ci. 816, 825-26, 116 F. Supp. 588, 593-94 (1953).
125. APP 7-103.12(3) (a); AFPI 54-505-06; NPD 40-201.1(b).
126. Acme Chair Co., ASBCA No. 2019 (1955); Chemical Service Corp., ASBCA No. 734
(1951); Hubbell & Miller Co., ASBCA No. 1111 (1953); Townsco Contracting Co., ASBCA
No. 1169 (1953).
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ment wishes to rely on as being final decisions as a part of its overall
contention that the contractor has not exhausted his contractual remedy.
The rule of interpretation that a writing is to be construed against the
author has wide application in this area and explains why one letter
appealed from will give jurisdiction to a board of contract appeals while
the same letter, not appealed, will not be considered a final decision.
During the thirty days after the contractor has received an otherwise
final decision, the contracting officer may take some action which will
deprive his decision of its original finality. The parties may resume nego-
tiations for a settlement.3-20 The contractor makes out a clear case when
he can point to some letter or memorandum received in the thirty day
period from the contracting officer which indicates that the decision is
being reconsidered. It is customary for boards of contract appeals to
read together the decision and all written communications passing be-
tween the parties in the thirty day interval following receipt of the deci-
sion by the contractor to ascertain whether at the end of that period the
contracting officer still intended his decision to be final.
It is not unusual for a contractor to request that the contracting officer
reconsider his decision. Such a request does not, in and by itself, qualify
as a notice of appeal.2 7 A contracting officer who within the thirty day
period writes to invite the contractor to a conference, has probably done
enough to deprive his decision of its original finality. In some of the older
cases it was said that a contracting officer has no power to extend the
appeal period because he may not waive a right that has already vested
in the United States.- 8 In Radio and Television Corp.," the ASBCA
held that the extension to 45 days of a contractor's time to appeal indi-
cated an intention on the part of the contracting officer that his decision
not become final for the first fifteen days.
In Jacob Kleininan,3 ° the contracting officer orally promised the con-
tractor that he would give reconsideration to a decision provided the
contractor would write him before expiration of the thirty day period.
The contractor did write within the specified period. The contracting
officer did not issue his second decision until some four months later.
The WDBCA upheld the timeliness of the appeal taken within thirty
days of the second decision.
It is well settled that a contracting officer is without power to issue a
127. AT. Kornman Co, ASBCA No. 282 (1950); Trimore Clothes, Inc., ASBCA No.
736 (1951) ; Star Fastener, Inc., ASBCA No. 1603 (1954).
128. Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 2S9 (1941) ; Pacific Hardware Steel Co.
v. United States, 49 Ct. Ci. 327 (1914); Thompson, Trustee, WDBCA No. 1075 (1945);
H.R.H. Construction Corp., WDBCA No. 1058 (1945).
129. ASBCA No. 2570 (1955).
130. WDBCA No. 939 (1945).
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new decision, replacing a prior final decision from which no appeal was
taken within the thirty day period (noting the Jacob Kleinman excep-
tion).13 The prior decision is a right vested either in the Government or
the contractor which may not be waived without payment of considera-
tion. Contractors often will attempt to appeal from a letter of the con-
tracting officer reiterating his position taken in an unappealed decision.
Such appeals are untimely, even in instances where the contracting officer
has not cited his prior decision. 132
In one situation, however, a new decision by the contracting officer will
revive a right of appeal previously lost by the contractor. In his notice
terminating a supply contract for default, the contracting officer may
have recited that specific causes of delay were not excusable within the
meaning of the "Default" article.133 If later, assuming the Government
has a continuing need for the items which were to be delivered under the
defaulted contract, the Government places a repurchase contract, the
contracting officer will send the defaulted contractor a notice of excess
costs (viz., for the difference in contract prices). At this time the con-
tractor may raise a dispute as to excusable causes of delay in its perform-
ance, even including the specific causes recited in the unappealed decision
of the contracting officer terminating the contract. If the ASBCA finds
for the contractor on these questions, the termination for default is con-
verted into a "Termination for the Convenience of the Government"
which means that the Government (a) loses its excess costs and (b) pays
termination costs to the contractor. 4 Only in the case of supply con-
tracts with the military departments may terminations for default be
administratively converted into terminations for convenience. 13 It is
questionable whether this theory of revival of the right to appeal would
be upheld by the courts which, in the form outlined, have not ruled on it.
In a case where the ASBCA has previously ruled on specific allegations
of excusable causes of delay, upon an appeal from the default termina-
tion, it will treat such allegations as res ajudicata and will allow the
contractor to contest only the reasonableness and propriety of the repur-
chase contract. 36
The filing of a timely appeal, of course, prevents the decision of the
contracting officer from becoming a final decision. During the interval
between the filing of the appeal and the decision of the Secretary, the
131. Grasty Pallet Co., ASBCA No. 920 (1951).
132. Ibid.
133. DeLisser Manufacturing Corp., ASBCA No. 1002 (1952); James Lumber Co., ASBCA
No. 986 (1952) ; Bockmier Lumber Sales Agency, Inc., ASBCA No. 1235 (1953).
134. Fulford Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 2143 (1955); John Peterson, ASBCA No.
1633 (1954).
135. General Provision 11(e), Standard Form 32 (Supply Contract).
136. Aero-Land Supply Co., ASBCA No. 1869 (1954).
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contracting officer may amend his decision and either settle with the con-
tractor or he may find certain issues against the contractor which, in his
original decision, he had decided in the contractor's favor.23 7 Also, the
contracting officer may amend his decision in the initial thirty day period
even without an appeal by the contractor.1 38
When the appeal is presented before the Secretary or board of contract
appeals, Government counsel has the right of attacking the contracting
officer's decision as being too generous to the contractor.?' The contrac-
tor, in Charles H. Tompkins Co.,4 0 appealed to the ASBCA from a deci-
sion of the Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals Board, thereby
vacating the decision of the C & A board. As to one issue the ASBCA
held that the lower board had improperly found for the appellant. An
appeal, therefore, searches the whole record.
D. Requisites of an Appeal
There is only one case in which an oral appeal will satisfy the require-
ments of the Disputes clause. At the time of a hearing before a board
of contract appeals on a premature appeal, the contracting officer may
make an oral decision denying the contractor's claim. It is sufficient if
thereafter, during the course of the hearing, the contractor appeals
orally.' 4 ' A reporter transcribes both the decision and appeal which
become parts of a verbatim transcript of the hearing. A board of contract
appeals in such cases may elect to decide the merits of the dispute, or, in
its discretion, it may refuse to render a decision.'
Several apparently mandatory requirements of the Disputes clause are
merely permissive. An appeal need not be addressed to the Secretary,
provided an appeal is intended. Appeals addressed to the ASBCA, the
contracting officer,' 43 and the purchasing office of the contracting officer 44
have been held to be sufficiently addressed. The addressing of a pur-
137. Sentinel Aircraft Inc., ASBCANo. 836 (1951).
138. Ibid.
139. Montgomery Construction Co., ASBCA No. 2556 (1956); Jeneckes, IBCA 44, 62
IM. 449 (1955). In Wichita Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 2522 (1955) thc contracting
officer unilaterally ixed a new and lower contract price after performance but pursuant to
a price redetermination article of the contract. The contractor then appealed asking a higher
price. The contracting officer next reconsidered his original decision and reduced the contract
price still further. The contractor thereafter appealed asking a price higher than that claimed
in his original appeal. The ASBCA, on appeal, fixed the price above the contracting offce's
second decision and slightly below his first.
140. ASBCA No. 2661 (1955).
141. Sam Tour & Co., ASBCA No. 2375 (1955).
142. Ibid.
143. New York Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 289 (1950); Raylaine Worsteds, Inc,
ASBCA No. 1342 (1955).
144. National Magnet Wire Corp., ASBCA No. 539 (1950).
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ported notice of appeal to the Secretary, if done, will, however, have an
important bearing on the question of intention to appeal.
The following letter from an attorney was held by the ASBCA to be
sufficient as a notice of appeal in New York Engineering Co.:
"Your letter, addressed to the New York Engineering Company, terminating the
aforesaid contract, together with your findings of fact upon which the notice of
termination is based, were received by it on September 9, 1948, and have been referred
to me.
"Under date of September 7, 1948, the Secretary, of the Department of the Army,
was advised that, by reason of the breach of the contract, on the part of the Govern-
ment and its failure or refusal to cure the same, the New York Engineering Company
elected to terminate the contract and will look to the Government for such damages as
it may sustain. A copy of such communication was mailed to you [the contracting
officer].
"It is my observation, however, that there is no basis for the action taken by you.
That the conclusion reached by you is erroneous because, in the main, the pertinent
findings of fact are contrary to the actual facts and inconsistent with the facts there-
tofore found and reported, and important facts relative thereto have been omitted."' 40
An even stronger case for the Government was Lehigh-Portland Cement
Company, in which the WDBCA upheld, as a sufficient notice of appeal,
a letter which ended:
"We can see no reason why we should have to make an appeal to the Secretary of
War for an adjustment which is specifically contained in a Contract and Change
Order which have been formally and properly executed by both the Government and
ourselves.
"In our opinion, we are clearly entitled to payment at $2.095154 per barrel f.o.b.
shipping point and we respectfully request that payment be so made."'140
Also, in National Magnet Wire Corporation, the following letter was
held by the ASBCA to constitute an appeal:
"We beg to advise you that pursuant to Section 20 of the contract entitled 'Dis-
putes,' we are preparing presently an appeal from your decision, which will be sub-
mitted within 30 days from this notice."'1 47
Accordingly, it is accurate to say that an appeal need follow no fixed
or precise formula of words and that ambiguous appeals will be con-
strued in favor of the author rather than against him. Inasmuch as the
thirty day provision effects a forfeiture, boards of contract appeals will
liberally interpret all letters sent by a contractor to the Government in
the thirty days after the decision of the contracting officer.' 48 If a con-
tractor makes reference to the decision and indicates dissatisfaction
145. ASBCA No. 289 (1950) at 6. (Emphasis added.)
146. WDBCA No. 355 (1944).
147. See note 144 supra (Emphasis added).
148. Cases cited notes 143-46 supra.
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therewith, he stands a good chance of having his letter later treated as
an appeal.
There is a counterrule, however, against which a notice of appeal, not
fully labeled, may run. A request for reconsideration by the contracting
officer of his decision is not a notice of appeal.142 A board of contract
appeals will read such an instrument as a whole to determine if recon-
sideration only is desired.' ° A "request for review by higher authority"
or an expression of dissatisfaction accompanied by resignation to the
fact that the contracting officer has made up his mind, will remove the
letter from this latter category.
E. Proof of Mailing
In order to establish that a given letter of appeal is untimely, the
Government must show both the date of receipt of the decision of the
contracting officer (usually this is done by a Registered or Certified mail
return receipt) and the date on which the notice of appeal was deposited
in the mails. Proving this latter date usually presents the greatest prob-
lem, especially where the contractor has sent his letter of appeal by
ordinary mail. The postmark does not allow for a presumption that the
letter was deposited on its date but merely that the letter was forwarded
on that date.' It should be remembered that in doubtful cases the con-
tractor will be contending that the letter was forwarded before the date
of the postmark.
In Schroeder Tool & Engineering, Inc.,1a2 the Air Force trial attorney
was successful in proving that the appeal was mailed on the 31st day
after the decision was received by the contractor. Through extensive
depositions of postal employees, it was shown that the president of the
appellant corporation had given the letter to a registry clerk one day
late. The ASBCA said, in an often-repeated statement:
"The time within which an appeal may be taken is fixed by contract between the
parties, and if not taken within that time the contracting officer's decision becomes
final and conclusive so far as we are concerned. We could no more extend the time by
one day than by 6ne month.' 2 3
Time is computed in the usual manner. The first day of the stated
period is excluded while the final day is included. If the last day is a
Sunday or holiday, the contractor is given until the end of the next work-
ing day.'5 Saturdays as such do not qualify as holidays. Although the
149. Cases cited note 127 supra.
150. Ibid.
151. Boyd Contracting Co., ASBCA No. 2243 (1955), which cites 25 A.L.R. 21 (1923).
152. ASBCA No. 351 (1952).
153. Id. at 3.
154. Id. at 2; J.A. Ross & Co., ASBCA No. 2326, at 26 (1955).
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ASBCA will not presume that a letter was mailed on the day it was post-
marked, the board will indulge in a rebuttable presumption that a given
letter was not sent earlier than the date placed thereon by the con-
tractor.'55 Where the Government proves the date of receipt and is able
to show an untimely postmark, the contractor usually will have the duty
of coming forward with affirmative evidence of mailing. A delay involv-
ing several weeks or months before the appeal is received by the Govern-
ment places on the contractor an almost insurmountable burden of
proving a timely mailing.
VII. SCOPE OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION UNDER
THE DISPUTES CLAUSE
Questions of "timelieness," "prematurity" and "privity of contract"
have already been discussed. There yet remain a number of other cate-
gories of cases in which boards of contract appeals, since the fact Disputes
clauses allow only limited submission of controversies, have declined
jurisdiction.
A. Accord and Satisfaction
If, prior to an appeal, the contractor and contracting officer have
already made an agreement settling the matter in dispute, there can be
no appeal by reason of the express wording of the Disputes clause. A
settlement must be distinguished from a compromise. Only the General
Accounting Office, or the Attorney General when the matter is in suit,
may compromise a claim against, or in behalf of, the United States. 5 ' A
compromise implies a yielding of fixed belief or principle after giving
consideration and substantial weight to the element of expected success
or failure in litigation.157
This latter principle may raise the further question of whether the
executive departments and agencies have any power to settle or adjudi-
cate disputes. The right to amend contracts by Supplemental Agree-
ments and unilateral Change Orders has long been recognized. 58 It is
but an incident to the power originally to let public contracts. Likewise,
the power to agree on methods of settling future disputes is but an
incident to the power to amend contracts. 19
The acceptance by a contractor, without protest, of an amount less than
that claimed against the Government will not operate as a final settle-
155. Pocono Apparel Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 2400 (1954).
156. 18 Comp. Gen. (1939); 4 Comp. Gen. 404 (1924).
157. See 38 Ops. Atty. Gen. 98 (1934).
158. McCord v. United States, 9 Ct. Cl. 155 (1873).
159. See United States v. Corliss Steam-Engine Co., 91 U.S. 321 (1875). See also notes
14-45 supra.
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ment of his account.' The contractor may either appeal or sue for the
balance, depending on the nature of the claim. He may accept what is
awarded him by a board of contract appeals and thereafter sue in the
Court of Claims, relying on Public Law 356. His signing a release or
supplemental agreement, however, will bar his claim' unless he can
show that fraud or duress, including economic duress,0 2 vitiated his
consent. The same result is reached in cases where the contractor has
signed a unilateral change order received from the contracting officer.
B. Final Payment
Final payment standing alone, under the Miller Act, has a peculiar
significance which, in recent years, has not been carried over into other
subdivisions of Government Contracts Law."'a During its first years, the
WDBCA held that final payment under a contract would deprive the
board of jurisdiction since, by that time, the contract would be fully
executed. In Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co.,0 4 the WDBCA reversed
its prior holdings and assumed jurisdiction after final payment. The
General Accounting Officeles and the courts0 0 similarly hold that claims
may be made under contracts after final payment and until final
settlement.
The question therefore is as to when final settlement occurs. It can
come about in a variety of ways. A general release executed by the
parties is one example.' 67 A Settlement Certificate,0 3 issued by the GAO
after submission to it of data on a claim by both the contractor and the
executive department or agency, is another, and probably the best,
example.
160. St. Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Ry. Co. v. United States, 26S U.S. 169 (192S).e
161. Hargrave v. United States, 80 Ct. CL 642 (1955) ; Irwin v. United State:, 104 Ct. CL
84 (1945); Sanders v. United States, 104 Ct. CL 1, 60 F. Supp. 483 (1945); Euclide J.
Ouellette, ASBCA No. 2596 (1955), in which the contractor was held bound by the following:
"Except as hereby modified all terms and conditions of said contract, ... h remain
unchanged and in full force and effect."
162. Fruhauf Southwest Garment Co. v. United States, 126 CL CL 51, 62, 111 F. Supp.
945, 951 (1953); B. Fischer Co., ASBCA No. 505 (1951); Parkside Clothes, Inc., ASBCA
No. 261 (1951), holding existence of economic duress against the Government; True Quality
Shoe Co., ASBCA No. 2332 (1955); National Construction Co., ASBCA No. 2383 (1955).
163. Globe Indemnity Co. v. United States, 291 U.S. 476 (1934).
164. WDBCA No. 1265 (1946). For cases following Reed & Prince see Afarhall Sport-
wear, Inc., ASBCA No. 577 (1951); Production Line Mfanufacturers, Inc., ASBCA No. 816
(1951); Boyd Contracting Co., ASBCA No. 1504 (1953); Woodcraft Corp., ASBCA No.
2660 (1955).
165. 30 Comp. Gen. 335 (1951); 33 Comp. Gen. 93 (1953).
166. Albert & Harrison, Inc. v. United States, 1 CCF 658 (SJD.N.Y. 1943).
167. J.G. Menihan Corp., Army BCANo. 1759 (1948).
163. 31 U.S.C.A. § 74.
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C. Statutes of Limitations and Laches
After ten years, the GAO is barred by statute from considering any
claim.'69 The six year statute of limitations,' 7" which bars court actions,
pertains to jurisdiction of the subject matter and need not be pleaded by
the Government as an affirmative defense.
It is significant to note that the ASBCA has ruled that it is not bound
by any statute of limitations,'" a ruling which assumes considerable
importance when viewed in connection with the rule that final payment
does not terminate jurisdiction under the Disputes clause. The board will
accept jurisdiction even though after its decision a contractor can receive
payment only under a private bill in Congress. In one case a District
Court has taken jurisdiction following such a decision of the ASBCA,
under facts indicating that the six year statute of limitations of the Tucker
Act may have been tolled, on equitable grounds. 72
In another case, after appealing, the contractor did not request a hear-
ing for twelve years. 3 The ASBCA, in denying a motion to dismiss
which cited several alternative grounds, did not discuss the question of
laches on the part of the contractor. The WDBCA, in a case decided be-
fore Reed & Prince Manufacturing Co., found that the Government was
barred by laches from asserting a claim against a contractor one year
after final payment. 174 It would appear that the equitable doctrine of
laches is not the solution to the problem. Ordinarily, laches can be
pleaded after expiration of the analogous statute of limitations,'73 which
in the disputes area would be the statute governing the GAO. However,
laches may not be pleaded against the Government which likewise is not
bound by any statute of limitations.' The Government in appearing
before boards a contract appeals does not do so in its sovereign capacity
but rather as an equal of the contractor. Imposition of the laches de-
fense on the contractor alone would seem to work an unfair result.
169. 31 U.S.C.A. § 71(a).
170. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2401(a). See Finn v. United States, 23 Ct. CI. 486, aff'd, 123 U.S.
227 (1887).
171. Conro Manufacturing Co, Inc., ASBCA No. 769 (1951).
172. Conro Manufacturing Co., Inc., v. United States (E.D. Pa. No. 78-62-46 1955)
(unreported court order).
173. Raylaine Worsteds, Inc., ASBCA No. 1842 (1955).
174. Randall Construction Co., WDBCA No. 675 (1944).
175. Bowman v. Wathen, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 189 (1843). See Holmberg v. Armbiecht,
327 U.S. 392 (1946).
176. United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 318, 325 (1824) ; United States v.
Thompson, 98 U.S. 486 (1878); United States v. Wurts, 303 U.S. 414, 416 (1938); Goltra
v. United States, 119 Ct. CI. 217, 252, 96 F. Supp. 618, 624 (1951).
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D. The Comptroller General
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 provides in part:
"Balances certified by the General Accounting Officer, upon the settlement of public
accounts shall be final and conclusive upon the Executive Branch of the Govern-
]Ment....L177
In the event that a contractor and an executive department submit a
controversy to the GAO for settlement, usually believing that it is outside
the scope of the Disputes clause, a board of contract appeals may not
later redetermine the questions thereafter decided by the Comptroller
General. 17
In a number of cases contractors have been able to persuade the
Comptroller General to refer a case back to the executive department for
a decision and appeal under the Disputes clause. Even after the Settle-
ment Certificate has been received the Comptroller General may indicate,
in a subsequent letter, that he did not mean finally to decide any ques-
tions of fact. In such cases the executive department reacquires jurisdic-
tion to determine, under the Disputes clause, the questions of fact in the
case."
79
The contractor does not lose his rights under the Disputes clause in
cases where an executive department unilaterally forwards an appeal to
the Comptroller General. s8  However, the contractor may lose his right
to appeal to the Secretary if he asks the Comptroller General to recon-
sider his decision. In the case where the executive department unilater-
ally forwards an appeal to GAO, the contractor may treat the action of
the department as a waiver of the Disputes clause and bring immediate
suit.1
81
The courts have never permitted the Comptroller General to act as the
"authorized representative" of a Secretary to determine appeals under
the Disputes clause. The limited standards of judicial review of Public
Law 356 do not pertain to any decision of the Comptroller General.
E. Res Adjudicata
In Lennox Metal Manufacturing Co.,1'82 the ASBCA considered itself
bound by a decision of a District Court, affirmed on appeal,1' finding
177. 31 U.S.C.A. § 74.
178. Brooks-Callaway Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. CL 6S9, 704 (1942); H.P. Andrews
Paper Co., ASBCA No. 2486 (1955).
179. Cornelia Garment Co, ASBCA No. 1673 (1954); Woodcraft Corp., ASBCA No.
2660 (1955).
180. Woodcraft Corp., ASBCA No. 2660 (1955).
181. Brooks-Callaway Co. v. United States, 97 Ct. Cl. 689 (1942).
182. ASBCA No. 2453 (1955), accord, Haggar Co., ASBCA No. 1469 (1953), which cites
28 U.S.CA. § 2519 (1952) as to effect of Court of Claims judgment against plaintiff.
183. 131 F. Supp. 717 (E.D.N.Y. 1954), aff'd, 225 F. 2d 302 (2d Cir. 1955).
1956]
FORDHAM LA.W REVIEW
that a contractor was not in default on the date of termination of his
contract. The Government had intervened in bankruptcy proceedings to
preserve, what the court termed, an equitable title to certain work in
process and which the Court indicated it would have protected but for
the improper termination. Lennox points up the possibility that adminis-
trative boards will find themselves bound by prior court decisions on
questions of fact in cases where the Attorney General has waived the
Disputes clause.
Boards of contract appeals in a few instances have cited prior decisions
of their own as being determinative of later disputes.'84 A contractor
may wish to reappeal on a question already decided or he may wish
further reconsideration after the time for asking reconsideration has
passed. Although it does not appear that boards of contract appeals have
passed on this question, there is a good deal of general arbitration law on
the subject. The majority view is that once the arbiters have finally
rendered their decision, they become functus officio and no longer have
any standing under the contract to decide the dispute.'8 5 At least one
case holds that where an engineer is to render decisions on questions
during the life of a contract, he has the power of correcting his decision
up to the time of completion of the contract.80
This problem is further complicated by questions of newly discovered
evidence. The contractor under such circumstances may be able success-
fully to contend that the new evidence has shaped the controversy into
a new dispute. Assuming a contractor decides to follow this latter route,
he should first approach the contracting officer for a new decision because
otherwise, under this theory, an appeal would be premature.
If the Secretary is held to be junctus officio to consider newly dis-
covered evidence, which is being presented after the decision on appeal,
it would seem that the contractor should be allowed a full judicial hearing
inasmuch as he has no Disputes clause under which to present his new
evidence.
F. Breach of Contract: Unliquidated Damages
The two most difficult areas in the field of jurisdiction under the Dis-
putes clause are "premature" appeals and "breach of contract."
The Comptroller General and the Attorney General, when a matter is
in suit, are the only administrative officials of the Government who have
the power to settle a claim for breach of contract.187 The present day
184. Aero-Land Supply Co., ASBCA No. 1869 (1954); Adams Manufacturing Co.,
ASBCA No. 2665 (1956), citing ASBCA No. 2555 (1955) (same appellant).
185. 6 Williston, Contracts § 1927(A) (rev. ed. 1938). See Aero-Land Supply Co.,
ASBCA No. 1869 (1954).
186. Palmer v. Clark, 106 Mass. 373, 389 (1871).
187. See notes 156, 157 supra.
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Standard Forms of Government contracts have been drafted to bring a
maximum number of disputes under the Disputes clause. The "Changes"
clause is the leading example.188 Additional costs become liquidated
under the clause in the form of an "equitable adjustment" which is made
a question of fact between the parties. "Equitable Adjustments" are also
provided for in the "Changed Conditions,"' 9 "InspectionMO "Suspen-
sion of Work"' 9 ' articles. Specific provision is made in the "Termination
for Convenience"' 92 article for an appeal under the Disputes clause in the
event that the parties are unable to agree on settlement costs.
Despite the broadness of coverage of the Standard Forms there still re-
main certain claims which arise in connection withi but not under the con-
tract. These claims are generally denominated as being for breach of
contract or for "unliquidated" damages. Boards of contract appeals lack
jurisdiction to determine the liability of the Government in such cases.
Although the Secretary of War, in his July 4, 1944 memorandum, granted
the WDBCA power to render findings of fact in such cases without ex-
pressing an opinion on liability (a grant of authority under which the
Army and Air Force Panels of the ASBCA continue to operate), the
GAO and the courts have indicated they consider such findings as being
at best merely advisory.9 3
A good example of breach of contract might seem to be a case where
the Government has refused to pay a contractor. However, the ASBCA
has taken jurisdiction over the question of whether a discount was
earned" and the question of withholdings by the Government of pay-
ments to be received by a bank under the Assignment of Claims Act of
1940195
A change order is proper only if it was reasonably contemplated at the
beginning of the contract as inhering in the work to be done. The issu-
ance of a change order requiring work beyond the scope of the original
contract renders the Government liable for damages for breach of con-
tract.' A contractor's proper forum for relief in such cases is in the
18. General Provision 2, Standard Form 32 (Supply Contract); General Provision 3,
Standard Form 23A (Construction Contracts).
189. General Provision 4, Standard Form 23A (Construction Contracts).
190. General Provision 5(b), Standard Form 23A (Construction Contracts).
191. General Condition (9), Corps of Engineers, U.. Army Construction Contract.
192. See ASPR 8-703, 32 C.F.R. 3.703.
193. Anthony P. Miller, Inc. v. United States, 111 Ct. C1. 252, 77 F. Supp. 209 (1943);
Langevin v. United States, 100 Ct. CL 15,31 (1943), 34 Comp. Gen. 20 (1954).
194. Control Engineering Corp., ASBCA No. 772 (1951); Shirtcraft Co., ASBCA No.
2819 (1955).
195. Adams Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 2555 (1955); cf. Scott Tcnt and Aving
Co, ASBCA No. 1591 (1954); Oakland Truck Sales, Inc., ASBCA No. 5-0 (1952).
196. Severin v. United States, 102 Ct. CL 74, cert. denied, 322 U.S. 733 (1943).
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courts and not before an administrative board. The Changes article
impliedly gives the Government the right to suspend the work for periods
reasonable in length of time without payment of any additional compen-
sation.'97 Should the delay be protracted into an unreasonable length of
time, the Government will be held to have breached the contract. In
neither case is the contractor entitled to any administrative relief unless
the contract contains a "Suspension of Work" provision.,98
At one time the ASBCA took the position that the late delivery of
Government Furnished Property was a breach of contract. 190 The
ASBCA, under the amended Government Furnished Property clause, now
holds that a contractor in such a case is entitled to an equitable adjust-
ment, o0 equating the late delivery of GFP to a delivery of defective GFP.
An irreconcilable conflict exists between decisions of contract appeal
boards and those of the courts on the characterization of various acts as
breach of contract or a "change" within the meaning of the Changes
clause. The two concepts are almost mutually exclusive. The decision of
a tribunal can be expected to favor its own jurisdiction. In clearcut cases,
however, the administrative panels are forced to yield to the jurisdiction
of the courts.
The rule is often stated that a Secretary may not determine, or com-
promise, general or unliquidated damages or damages for breach of con-
tract.2 '1 Liquidated damages were once highly favored in Government
contracts. Today, however, it is becoming increasingly rare to find such
provisions in Government contracts. The reason is quite simple. In view
of the interaction with the broad form excuses provision of the Default
article, virtually every assessment of liquidated damages results in an
expensive appeal under the Disputes clause, an appeal which in a high
percentage of cases is successful. The expression "unliquidated damages"
is not really used as the opposite of "liquidated damages" but rather is
meant to distinguish "equitable adjustments" or other amounts fixed by
the Disputes method.
The standard Default article provides that the contractor shall be
liable for actual damages to the Government in addition to excess costs.
Regulations of the various executive departments require the contracting
197. United States v. Rice, 317 US. 61 (1942).
198. Pressed Steel Car Co., ASBCA No. 2432 (1955) ; FM-. McGraw & Co. v. United States,
131 Ct. Cl. 501, 130 F. Supp. 394 (1955).
199. Franklin Iron & Metal Co., ASBCA No. 194 (1949); B. & G. Sales Co., ASBCA
No. 204 (1949); Quipco Associates, ASBCA No. 841 (1951).
200. Carteret Work Uniforms, ASBCA No. 1015 (1952); The Foster Co., ASBCA No. 975
(1952); L.T.H. Mfg. Co., ASBCA No. 1312 (1953); Cornelia Garment Co., ASBCA No.
1673 (1954).
201. William Cramp & Sons v. United States, 216 U.S. 494 (1910). See District of
Columbia v. Bailey, 171 U.S. 161 (1898).
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officer to initiate withholding of monies due the contractor to offset such
damages.O - The contractor has no right to appeal under the Disputes
clause such withholdings of "general" damages. His remedy is in either
the GAO or the courts.
G. Quasi Contractual and Equitable Rcmedies
No authority exists under the Disputes clause to reform or rescind a
contract.203 The Court of Claims on occasions has undertaken to reform
certain writings - ' as well as to make the Government pay for benefits
conferred on it as unjust enrichment. 5 In one case where there seemed
to be possibly an unjust enrichment, the ASBCA expressly declined juris-
diction and suggested that the contractor seek his remedy in the courts. 0
These questions, as well as problems of breach of contract, have arisen
in one significant body of cases, those involving sales of surplus property
"by lot." The contract expressly says that the "lot" is offered for sale
"as is and where is" without any warranty or representation by the
Government, even as to the description of the goods to be sold.-0 7 In a
long line of cases the ASBCA has held surplus property cases to be
beyond its jurisdiction since the appellant usually is seeking reformation,
rescission, unliquidated damages and the likeY. 3
Title II of the First War Powers Act -00 is the only instrument which
provides equitable relief within the military departments and the agencies
associated with the national defense. The ASBCA and similar boards
have no authority to review a denial of relief under Title 11II Such
claims are finally determined by the Contract Adjustment Boards of the
Army, Navy and Air Force, and comparable boards within the adminis-
trative agencies 21'
As for mistakes in bid, the General Accounting Office has the primary
202. See, e.g., Army Regulations AR 35-3220, ff 43, 18 July 1952.
203. Motive Parts Co. of America, Inc., ASBCA No. 2213 (1954); Harrison Iron Worls,
ASBCA No. 2269 (1954); Magnolia Lumber Sales Co., ASBCA No. 1402 (19.93); Forge
Metal Products, ASBCA No. 2220 (1955).
204. Harrison Engineering and Construction Corp. v. United States, 107 Ct. Cl. 205, 63
F. Supp. 350 (1946).
205. United States v. Georgia Marble Co., 106 F. 2d 955 (5th Cir. 1939).
206. Williams Sales Co., ASBCA No. 1840 (1954).
207. General Sale Term and Condition 2, Standard Form 114 (Sale of Government
Property).
20S. Goodwin Novelty Co., ASBCA No. 727 (1951); Paul Tavetian, ASBCA No. 2429
(1954); Tulsa Army & Navy Store, ASBCA No. 2192 (1954).
209. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 611.
210. Fenton Industries, ASBCA No. 2635 (1955); Radio Frequency Laboratories, Inc.,
ASBCA No. 1730 (1953).
211. See, e.g., APP tI 30-403.2e(4), f(1).
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jurisdiction,212 an authority which has been delegated to certain of the
technical services within the military departments (in limited cases) but
which has not been delegated to the ASBCA.212
VIII. CONCLUSION
The face and form of the Disputes method has changed many times
since Kiklberg. Some of these changes have taken place gradually and
almost imperceptibly. Others, like the changes of the past seven years,
have been incisive.
Whether the remaining years of this decade will see any changes of
the magnitude of Moorman, or Wunderlick, or Public Law 356, will
depend in great measure on the solution to, or failure to solve, a number
of problems. These problems perhaps can best be stated in a series of
questions:
(a) Are the courts to be limited to statutory criteria in their review of
Disputes decisions?
(b) Will a contractual or statutory period of limitations be placed on
the power to entertain Disputes?
(c) Is the bar on administrative consideration of breach-of-contract-
unliquidated-damages cases to continue?
(d) Are the executive department heads to be allowed to enlist the aid
of the District Courts on subpoena and contempt matters?
(e) Is it possible for Congress, in the light of the fourteen years'
experience of the Boards of Contract Appeals within the military depart-
ments, to enact an omnibus bill paralleling the Administrative Procedure
Act?
The Disputes method, with or without further refinements, will, it
seems safe to say, be with us for many years to come. As a house, for
its continued existence, needs a foundation, so it is with systems to regu-
late human affairs. The necessary foundation for the preservation of the
Disputes method is summed up in a single word, confidence. The Gov-
ernment, the contractors, and most important of all, the taxpayers must
continue to have confidence in the Disputes method. This confidence,
which the writer believes presently exists, will continue, provided the
membership of each of the various appeal boards remain objective and fair,
determining each controversy in the light of the decisions of the courts,
and not omitting some measure of equity and a great measure of
understanding.
212. See Morrow, Principals Applicable to Mistakes in Bids on Federal Construction Con-
tracts, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1956) (p. 1, this issue).
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